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Economic development is seen as the best way for Aboriginal communities to
improve their welfare and lessen the considerable disadvantages they suffer. Unfortu-
nately, the economics profession has shown little interest in their plight. Agricul-
tural and resource economists have much to offer in helping to foster economic
development in Aboriginal communities throughout Australia. Suggestions are
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research and policy issues to be tackled by the profession in the coming





 There is no doubt that Aboriginal communities and
most Aborigines are signiﬁcantly disadvantaged with respect to most other
Australians and Australian communities – a disadvantage that I would




 I believe that the
 
*P r esidential address to the 47th Annual Conference of the Australian Agricultural and




  Ron Duncan is Visiting Professor, School of Economics, The Australian National Uni-
versity, and since February 2003, Executive Director, Paciﬁc Institute of Advanced Studies




Reference to Australian Aboriginal communities in the present paper should be read as




In terms of what I consider to be the best indicator of economic development of a society,
life expectancy, Aboriginal disadvantage is shown by the fact that Aboriginal males and
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agricultural and resource economics profession can make a considerable
contribution to the improvement of their circumstances through the advice
it can provide about economic development. Our research and practical
experience in areas such as agricultural policy and farm management, nat-
ural resource management, and institutional development, and the increas-
ing amount of work our members are doing in developing countries, can be
usefully applied to the issues that I believe are most relevant to fostering
economic development in Australian Aboriginal communities.
I do not claim that the disadvantages suffered by Aborigines are solely
due to the lack of economic development of their communities or their lack
of access to economic opportunities available in the wider economy. But
without providing any robust evidence, I would argue that a major part of
their disadvantage is for this reason. Moreover, in making this claim, I
would argue that discriminatory attitudes have contributed to their present
plight and that a substantial argument can be made for special efforts in
their favour to overcome their present social and economic disadvantages.
Given the enormity of the situation, there has been surprisingly little
work by the wider economics profession on issues related to Aboriginal dis-
advantage in Australia. I suspect that this reluctance has stemmed in part
from the fact that it is a politically sensitive area and also one that is sub-
ject to academic jealousies. However, if this is the case, such sensitivities
should be ignored in the interests of the Aboriginal peoples, especially if, as
I believe, economists, and agricultural and resource economists in particu-
lar, have so much to offer.
Given the large areas of land that Aboriginal groups have gained control
over in one form or another in recent years, there are very important ques-
tions about how this land will be managed, whether for agricultural or
other activities. Agricultural and farm management economists can con-
tribute a great deal through advice on how best to manage these lands. In
many cases these lands are highly susceptible to environmental problems
and natural resource economists can help with advice on that topic. There
is the high probability that further mineral resources will be discovered on
Aboriginal land, which has implications for management of the resource
rents accruing from mining projects. Resource economists can advise on the
design of mining contracts, mineral taxation policy and management of
resource revenues such as through trust funds. The form of land tenure
under which most of this land is presently held is customary ownership or
common property. In recent years, a great deal has been learnt about the
management of common property resources, and when collective action
may be the best way to manage externalities. But land tenure has evolved
in all societies, and it will be no different in Australia where, since Mabo,
the tenure over considerable areas of land has changed from crown land, 
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 However, common property tenure and management
has not proved to be the best form of management for growth in product-
ivity. Therefore, as in other countries, over time there will be pressure for
change to some form of individual land title. This kind of change is a basic
form of institutional change. Agricultural and resource economists have
largely led the way in Australia in analysing how the new institutional eco-
nomics can assist in creating a better basis for economic development in
lower-income countries, and this knowledge can be very usefully applied in
Australia.
 
2. A development issue
 
As I said, the basic premise of this paper is that the terrible state of Ab-
original community living standards, particularly in rural areas (as shows up
in social indicators such as life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality,
and the incidence of disease), is primarily the result of a lack of economic
development in these communities. Further, I believe that the best means of
substantially improving their welfare will be through economic develop-
ment in their communities. This is a contested premise. ‘Developmentalism’
is almost used as a term of abuse in some social science quarters in Aus-
tralia in discussions about policies relating to Aborigines. But the past
emphasis on welfare policies has not led to any signiﬁcant improvement in
their well-being – which is reﬂected in the fact that up to 90 per cent of the
income of Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory (NT) comes
from the Commonwealth and NT governments (Pritchard and Gibson
1996). Some may wish to argue that different welfare policies would lead to
substantially better results (e.g., ATSI Social Justice Commissioner 1994). I
disagree. To some extent, rural Aboriginal communities have a choice as to
whether they wish to undertake economic development; those in urban
areas do not. But the choice appears highly constrained by the freedom of
people to leave rural communities, the availability of information about
what is happening in the wider world, and the continuous comparisons of
their welfare with that of the rest of Australia and other societies.
Globally, the evidence is that substantial improvement in the welfare of
poor societies only occurs through, initially, provision of clean water and
sanitation and control of pests and diseases, and later, through greater
access to income-earning assets such as education and land, and oppor-
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visible relationships. The important question is how to set these processes
in place and sustain them? It is of interest why the approach to improving
the welfare of rural Aboriginal communities in Australia has been so dif-
ferent from that adopted in what are termed the developing countries?
As with Native American Indians in the USA, the Aboriginal population
in Australia makes up only a small percentage of the total population of
a high-income country. For this reason, there is a tendency towards adopt-
ing the seemingly ‘easy’ solution to their problems through income redis-
tribution measures, but which creates difﬁcult-to-overcome problems of
welfare-dependency, as so well described by Noel Pearson. This tendency is
underpinned in Australia by the predominance of a democratic socialism ethos
that gives preference to government-based solutions over solutions relying
on individual effort and enterprise. Poor countries cannot afford income
redistribution solutions to what is generally a matter of mass poverty. In
their case, the only solution to poverty is economic development of the
whole country. In a situation such as in Australia, where the relatively small
disadvantaged group has been seen as being inferior in some way – as well
as being disadvantaged in terms of income, education, and health – a dif-
ferent set of institutions to that available to the majority appears necessary
in order to provide an appropriate environment for economic development
to take place. However, as might be expected, there is resistance by the
wider society to the establishment of a special set of institutions for the
minority group.
Glenn Loury (2001), of Boston University, has eloquently argued the
case for afﬁrmative action for African–Americans in the United States. He
distinguishes between racial discrimination and racial stigmatising. Because
he sees that African–Americans have been stigmatised to such an extent as
to adversely affect how others see them in relation to their work and other
capacities, he argues that race blindness, or ‘colour blindness’, in policies is
not sufﬁcient to overcome the social disadvantage they face. He therefore
argues for ‘race egalitarianism’, i.e. because of an unjust history, special
efforts should be made to reduce inequities of wealth and power between
African–Americans and other groups. To quote Loury (2001, pp. 40–41):
Discrimination is about how people are treated; stigma is about who,
at  the deepest cognitive level, they are understood to be. As such,
these distinct ways of framing the problem of racial inequality lead to
radically distinct intellectual and political programs. A diagnosis of
discrimination yields a search for harmful or malicious actions …
using the law or moral suasion to curtail or modify these actions. But
seeing stigma as the disease inclines one to look for insidious habits of
thought, selective patterns of social intercourse, biased processes of 
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social cognition, and defective public deliberations when seeking a
cure. Here the limits of conventional legal action and moral suasion,
and the need for deeper and more far-reaching structural reform,
come clearly into view. To be sure, … reform should redress resource
disparities between groups. … This kind of reform, while necessary, is
far from sufﬁcient … achieving the elusive goal of racial justice re-
quires that we undertake … to eliminate the objective disparity in
economic and social capacity between the race-segregated networks of
afﬁliation that continue to characterize the social structure of Amer-
ican public life …
I believe that the economic and social disadvantage of Australian Abori-
gines will not be overcome without the establishment of special institutions
that take account of their special situation within the Australian society.
The institutions that I am talking about are essentially institutions that
directly assist them to participate in economic activities. As well as these
kinds of changes, Loury is talking about the need for change in much more
complex social institutions. I have no doubt that similar social structural
changes are also needed in Australia. But that is not the subject of this
paper.
For Australian Aborigines the acquisition of land is important for the
economic development needed to improve their welfare. However, as
Altman (1995) – an Australian economist who has devoted a career to
improving the welfare of Aboriginal communities – recognised:
An economic takeoff by the indigenous sector, Australia-wide, will not
occur because of native title. Land alone cannot guarantee economic




ial expertise will also be needed to promote the development of the
indigenous land base. (p. 298)
I would argue, however, that even these other factors are not sufﬁcient for
economic development to take place. Over the past 50 years, the theoretical
understanding of the economic growth process and the implementation of
economic development strategies have undergone huge changes (Duncan
and Pollard 2002). Following growth theorists such as Harrod (1939), Domar
(1946) and Solow (1956), development assistance for many years (and still,
in some agencies) was based on the notion that the lack of ﬁnancial and
physical capital was the main reason for countries being poor. Hence, the
multilateral lending agencies and aid agencies in high-income countries
were set up to transfer savings from rich to poor countries. Later, follow-
ing Becker (1964), economic growth theory and developmental practice 
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focused also on health and education to build human capital. By the early
1980s, the realisation that so many of the projects that they had funded had
failed saw the multilateral agencies adopt so-called Structural Adjustment
Programs, based on the premise that the policy environment in the develop-
ing countries was not conducive to project success. But Structural Adjust-
ment Programs have not led to much better growth performance (Burnside
and Dollar 1997). In the 1990s, following North (1990), and more recently
Olson (1996) and De Soto (1989; 2000), the focus of developmental assist-
ance has shifted – at least in some quarters – to the creation of institutional
frameworks in which physical and human capital and innovativeness will
ﬂourish.
But changing and creating basic economic and social institutions within
a society is very difﬁcult. Both North and Olson were pessimistic about the
likelihood for such change; implying, as it does, change in the political
power balance within the society. The political status quo is what it is for
good reason, and changing it to provide enhanced possibilities for the poor
to participate in economic activities is threatening to the ruling interests.
Looked at from this angle, promoting economic development and reduc-
ing widespread poverty is a very complex and difﬁcult process. The transfer
of capital to poor countries or regions and its transformation into roads
and dams or schools and medical centres is, by comparison, a simple task.
But without institutional changes in areas such as constitutions (to provide
equal opportunity), judiciaries (to ensure impartial treatment), social capital
(to generate trust throughout the community), rights to education (to pro-
vide equal access for the disadvantaged), or land titles (to provide security
for investors), the provision of roads, schools, and hospitals is likely to have
little impact.
Agricultural and resource economists have embraced the New Insti-
tutional Economics more enthusiastically than the general economics pro-
fession in Australia. This may be because they are doing more work in
developing countries where they are forced to think more deeply about the
process of economic development. For these reasons, agricultural and re-
source economists are in a position to make a contribution to the kinds of
institutional developments that I see as necessary in Australia for economic
development in Aboriginal communities.
In one of the few papers in the agricultural economics literature dealing
with Australian Aboriginal issues, McCann (1999) examined how the High
Court’s Mabo decision of 1992 and the Native Title Act of 1993 were lead-
ing to new institutions to handle the resolution of rights to land. McCann
suggested that the virtual overturning of the land tenure system for a large
part of Australia meant that the transaction costs of interpreting various
court decisions and the new parliamentary acts relating to native title, and 
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the costs of resolution of land claim disputes, would lead to new institu-
tions designed to reduce the transaction costs. In arriving at these sugges-
tions, McCann drew on Hayami and Ruttan’s (1985) idea that new or
changed institutions arose in response to changes in economic stimuli.
While Hayami and Ruttan had suggested that new institutions could be
‘induced’ by changes in technology, in factor endowments, and in product
demands, McCann hypothesised that the new institutions could arise in
response to increased transaction costs.
McCann explored this idea by examining the development of formal
institutions (such as the National Native Title Tribunal) and informal institu-
tions (such as regional agreements between mining companies and groups
of Aboriginal landowners) in efforts to reduce the transaction costs involved
in settling claims to land and providing tenure for various kinds of land
uses. In the New Institutional Economics context, the institution(s) that
become dominant will be those that provide the lowest transaction costs,
subject to the legislation that governs the actions of the various parties.
While much remains to be done in terms of putting practical ﬂesh on the
bones of the New Institutional Economics more generally, this line of
research appears to provide a fruitful way forward in assisting in the develop-
ment of an institutional framework that will provide a useful basis for the
determination of rights to land.
 
3. Land tenure and land management
 
Discussion of the management of land held by Aboriginal groups has been
largely dominated by political scientists, sociologists, human geographers,
environmental and bio-physical scientists, and urban and regional planners.
Agricultural and resource economists have had little involvement in the
debate, even though the writings on this topic frequently refer to it as nat-
ural resource management.
The High Court’s Mabo decision and subsequent Commonwealth legis-
lation, together with State and Territory legislation, has meant that increas-
ing areas of land are coming under the control (in various forms) of
Aboriginal groups. Without doubt, the ways in which this land is managed
will determine to a very large extent the future economic development of
Australian Aborigines. How it will be managed will depend largely on the
distribution of the rights to the land. In a sense, the High Court decision
and the subsequent Commonwealth legislation turned back the clock over
200 years in respect of the tenure of a large part of the Australian land area
and contingent waters. Land and water that had been taken in one way or
another into public hands has been returned to what is called customary,
traditional, or common ownership. 
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The most widely accepted position among economists with respect to the
relationship between land tenure, economic development, and environ-
mental sustainability is that secure, individualised land tenure is essential
for robust economic development and environmental sustainability. Secure,
individualised land tenure means that individuals hold the rights to use the
land for whatever purposes they wish, except for illegal activities and activ-
ities that attenuate the rights held by others, including the state. The title
may be freehold or it may be leasehold; but to give leaseholders the incen-
tive to develop the land to its full potential the lease should be sufﬁciently
long. To be secure, the property right must have the full backing of the gov-
ernment. Three very important consequences ﬂow from such rights. First,
the holder of the right to the land knows that he/she will be able to receive
the beneﬁts of any investments made in the land. Because investments such
as buildings or fences last for many years, leases have to be long-term. Sec-
ond, as secure, individual land title is the main form of collateral taken by
banks as security for loans, loans for investment and consumption pur-
poses can be raised by mortgaging the land. As De Soto (2000) says, ‘land
that cannot be mortgaged is dead capital’. If a country cannot provide such
security for loans, it is unlikely that it will be able to develop a mature
ﬁnancial sector. People will be limited to intrafamily credit or to borrowing
at very high interest rates and only for very short periods from informal
lenders. Third, if individuals have secure property rights over land, they will
be likely to take care of it. It is an asset that they will be keen to see
increase in value in order that it will generate a higher income stream for
themselves and their heirs.
For all these reasons, secure, individual property rights to land are likely
to lead to increased productivity, which means economic growth and devel-
opment. It is also likely to ensure sustainability of the land. When no one
has rights over the land – a situation of ‘open access’ – none of these con-
ditions hold. The land cannot be used as security for credit, people are not
willing to invest in it to improve its productivity because they will not be
able to gain the beneﬁts of their investments, and everyone who can gain
access to it will exploit the land to the maximum, which will lead to its
deterioration.
But there are few instances of open access as far as land is concerned.
Where land is not held under freehold, it is under some form of ‘common
property’ ownership. Either the state controls it and manages it as a state
enterprise or leases it out to individuals on long-term leases; or land is held
as common property (‘customary ownership’) by groups of people (such as
tribes or clans). The question arises whether land held under forms of com-
mon property is managed in as productive and environmentally sustainable
a manner as land held under individual tenure. 
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The most dramatic comparison between the two forms of tenure has
been seen in China and Vietnam, where land under state control and earlier
farmed by collectives was subsequently leased on a long-term basis to indi-
vidual farm households. The difference in productivity between the case
where individuals did not hold rights to the land and therefore had no
vested interest in its performance, and where farmers now have the right to
the output from the land, in both countries has been breathtaking. In a
period of a few years, Vietnam moved from having to import over one mil-
lion tons of rice a year to where it is now the second largest rice exporter in
the world. An agricultural revolution of nearly similar magnitude took
place in China.
Customary ownership of land is not always clearly common property, as
individuals within the ownership group are often given certain rights such
as rights to farm or to erect housing. However, because these rights are not
such that a bank can take a mortgage over a title to the land, and indi-
viduals cannot be sure that they will be able to reap the beneﬁts of any
investments they may make, it is unlikely that the land will be utilised in as
productive a manner as where there is secure, individual tenure. There may
well be investment in the land but it is likely to be at a suboptimal level. A
surprising point about the agricultural revolutions in China and Vietnam
was that they took place in the absence of clarity about the farm house-
holds’ rights to mortgage, sell or inherit the land. It may well be that agri-
cultural production increased so dramatically because the countries were
well inside their transformation frontier, and while farmers had sufﬁcient
security of tenure to provide incentive for increased effort on their part,
production is still suboptimal because their land rights are not fully secure.
In fact, there has been little in the way of long-term investments by farmers in
China and Vietnam. Most of the gains in productivity appear to have come








. 2001). Clearer and more secure rights to land could
lead to even greater production.
These experiences show that signiﬁcant development can take place with
individual leasehold tenure of state- or society-owned land. Fiji’s experi-
ence shows that agricultural development can take place under individual
leasehold tenure of land held under customary ownership. Customary-
owned land in Fiji has been leased for up to 30-year periods under the
management of the Native Land Trust Board (a body under the control of
the tribal chiefs). This tenure regime was the basis for the establishment of
the sugar industry in Fiji, with the lands mainly leased from indigenous
Fijians by Indo-Fijian farmers. While the system appears to have broken
down recently – with Fijian landowners demanding that the leases not be
renewed – the problems are related to the distribution of the land rents and 
316 R. Duncan
 
© Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishing Ltd 2003
 
the mismanagement of the system, rather than being the fault of the regime
itself.
A question basic to Aboriginal economic development in Australia is
whether the land they control can make its largest contribution to their
welfare if it remains under customary ownership, or whether its use under
that tenure system will be suboptimal. I believe that the evidence points to
the establishment of individual rights to the land in some form being likely
to lead to the largest gains in welfare. But, unlike Warby (1997), I would
argue that this does not have to mean movement away from customary
ownership and individualisation of tenure through freehold. Long-term
leasehold with rights to sell, mortgage and inherit the lease means that the
land can be productively farmed, while the land remains under Aboriginal
ownership. Moreover, land supplies a ‘bundle’ of services and therefore a
bundle of land rights can be established, for example, the right to farm the
land and the right to access it for other purposes such as spiritual, cultural,
or leisure activities. The fact that land provides a bundle of rights and that
these rights can be distributed to various users has not been sufﬁciently re-
cognised in the debate over Native Title in Australia. The delineation,
establishment, and management of these various rights will be an import-
ant part of the future management of Aboriginal lands.
The change from customary ownership to individualisation of land
rights has always been a slow process, covering centuries, except where it
has been imposed externally, as with colonisation. Whether this kind of
change will take place and, if it does, how long it will take in the case of




 People living in a sub-
sistence economy often have a deep cultural or spiritual association with
the land. It appears that only as the people develop interactions with other
societies and as other means of livelihood besides subsistence are developed
that the dependence on land and the spiritual attachment are reduced.
Boserup (1965) saw the demand for individualisation of land tenure within
a customary ownership setting as a response to population pressure and the
need for increased productivity to increase the food supply. The change in
tenure is needed to give individuals greater incentives to make investments
in the land. Duncan and Chand (1997) have generalised this idea in arguing
that any change that leads to an increase in the implicit rental value of the
land, such as a road, new farming technology, or opening the country up to




One of the common causes of the long time taken to move to individual tenure has
been the difﬁculty of resolving land claim disputes in the process of registering customary
ownership. In Australia’s case, disputes are being settled as part of the process of establish-
ing Native Title and therefore disputed land claims should not be a signiﬁcant obstacle. 
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observe these kinds of pressures at work in the Paciﬁc island countries,
where most land is under customary ownership. A lessening of dependence
upon land for people’s livelihoods, such as through greater reliance upon






The question of compensation of Aboriginal people for their contribution
to the goals of maintenance of biodiversity and the sustainability of land
management has also been raised by Altman (2002). He argues that the
wider social beneﬁts that Aboriginal people are generating (and will gener-
ate in the future) through their management of the considerable land area
now under their control are not being recognised. Altman also makes the
point that the popular expectations for Aboriginal advancement from their
gaining control over land (which is often ‘remote, commercially marginal
and, at times, ecologically degraded’) are generally far too high. He points
out that introduced land uses have been hugely subsidised over the years,
often with the result being destruction of bio-diversity and adoption of
environmentally unsustainable and unproﬁtable practices. It seems reason-
able, therefore, for society to recognise the contributions that Aboriginal
people are making to Australia’s national and international obligations.
If this social beneﬁt is recognised, economists can contribute to the valu-
ation of the externalities that could be generated by sustainable manage-
ment of the extensive land now under Aboriginal control. As always, a key
issue will be the design of a payments mechanism that cannot easily be cor-
rupted and that does not lead to welfare dependency.
Altman (2002) is also critical of the lack of contribution of environ-
mental agencies to the effort being made to the wider good through Ab-
original land management. The lack of appreciation of national and state
agencies of the positive contributions by Aboriginal peoples to land man-
agement, the inappropriateness of the land management programs devel-
oped by these agencies for Aboriginal land, and the ineffectiveness of
communication with them, are concerns raised widely by social scientists. It
is claimed that Aboriginal groups are forced to rely on mainstream pro-
grams that have emphasised commercial rather than subsistence produc-
tion; that communication of information about these programs is culturally
inadequate, taking little account of their limited literacy and numeracy
skills and technological understanding; and that government agencies take




I am grateful to Charles Yala, a Papua New Guinean PhD student, for this insight. 
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Given their control over such vast areas of land, consideration has to be
given to the involvement of Aboriginal communities in the management of
environmental issues. Integrated water management, for instance, involving
as it does the management of private, public and common property issues
and use of both market-based and regulatory instruments, needs to involve
a mix of federal, state, regional and community-level responsibilities
(Young 1997; Challen 2001; Quiggin 2001). The role of community groups
in this integrated activity has not been well developed. In building on the
ideas of Marshall (2001) and Musgrave (2002) for better involvement of
regional and local communities, thought should be given to the integration
of Aboriginal communities and their collective action role.
 
5. Development of mineral resources
 
As owners of around 15 per cent of Australian land, Aboriginal groups are
already owners of land from which signiﬁcant mineral resources are being
exploited. The chances are high that further mineral discoveries will be
made on their land. The development of these resources can make an
important contribution to their welfare, but as seen in so many resource-
rich developing countries, it is difﬁcult to achieve improved welfare for the
majority of the population from such developments. Altman (1995) recognised
the likelihood of the so-called ‘resource curse’ problem arising in Aboriginal
communities in Australia:
There is a growing Aboriginal recognition that the payment of royalties
to incorporated bodies in areas affected by mining can result in exces-
sive regional politicking for these moneys, with a concomitant lack of
attention to longer-term economic opportunities and an inability to
accumulate venture capital for investment. (p. 298)
Avoiding such ‘rent-seeking’ behaviour and ensuring that mineral dis-
coveries make the best possible contribution to the welfare of Aboriginal
communities involves negotiating effective contracts with mining compa-
nies and the effective management of the share of mining revenues accruing
to the communities. The mining contracts negotiated and the relationships
between mining companies and the owners of the lands being mined have
improved considerably over the past 30 years, especially in developing coun-
tries. However, contract disputes are still a frequent occurrence in Australia
and elsewhere. As Duncan and Duncan (1997) have shown with respect
to mining in Papua New Guinea, contract disputes between customary 
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landowners and mining companies may arise because of asymmetry of
information between developers and the mining companies, the time incon-
sistency of contracts, and the incompleteness of contracts.
These problems may arise in respect of the size of the mineral reserves,
the mineral prices to be expected over the life of the project, and the
project’s likely environmental impacts. Duncan and Duncan suggested that
better design of contracts could ameliorate these problems and reduce the
likelihood of contract disputes that reduce investor conﬁdence and the
economic beneﬁts from such developments. Insecurity of contract leads to
reduced exploration and development and to short-run exploitation of
resources through reduced ﬁxed investment and increased ﬂy-in/ﬂy-out
activity, and ‘high-grading’ of ore bodies. It appears that contract theory
has much to offer with respect to the design of better mining contracts and
better outcomes for the people directly involved – as well as those indirectly
involved. Indirect effects which need to be addressed are the environmental
impacts outside the mining lease area, and the distribution of beneﬁts from
mining projects to Aboriginal groups that no longer have a direct associ-
ation with the land. The sustainability of regional economies following mine
closures is an issue that has not yet been confronted but which also needs
to be thought about. The institutional environment in which contract negoti-
ations take place also needs to be considered. Temu (2002) has pointed out,
with respect to mining contract negotiations in Papua New Guinea, how the
order in which agreements between landowners, the mining companies and
the government are agreed affects the balance of power between the dif-
ferent parties. He argues that in Papua New Guinea the obligation for a
landowner compensation agreement to be in place before the developer can
begin any work approved by the government, along with problems in the
approval process itself, undermines the State’s ownership right to the
resource and also undermines its ability to enforce this right.
As with the management of government revenues from mining projects in
developing countries, the management and distribution of the landowner
beneﬁts from mining projects have proven problematical the world over.
Various forms of trust funds have been established to handle these funds.
Some trust funds are completely under government control, as in Kiribati




. 1995); others are under the control of statutory
bodies, as is the case with funds held on behalf of Aborigines or Aboriginal
communities in Australia (Altman 1995). Draw-downs from the trust funds
may go directly into consolidated revenue or are invested wholly in public
infrastructure and state-owned enterprises, invested directly in domestic
industries, or paid directly to individuals – as is the case with the Alaskan
oil revenues. The Alaskan oil fund, with quarterly payment of the dividends
to all Alaskans, seems to be one of the most transparent and effective 
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forms of these funds. The Kiribati trust fund, built up earlier from phos-
phate mining revenues and more recently from ﬁshing licence fees, and
under direct government control, has been well-invested and continues to
grow. However, the Nauru trust funds, also built up from the mining of
phosphate and under government control, have been squandered in dis-
astrous investment activities. The good management of funds from diamond
mining in Botswana appears to have provided the basis for one of the best
records of economic growth over the past 40 years. According to Altman
(1995), the management of mining revenues realised from Aboriginal lands
and held in trust on their behalf has not been very praiseworthy, giving rise
to complaints of lack of transparency and poor investments.
These very different experiences raise a key question relating to the man-
agement of the funds from mining projects – whether accrued on behalf of
landowners or on behalf of all society: that is, how to align the incentives
facing the governing elite with the welfare of the intended beneﬁciaries?
Indeed, this appears to me to be the key problem to resolve in establishing
the basis for robust growth in an economy.
Similar problems of poor governance arise in relation to the management
of enterprises established on behalf of indigenous peoples as arise in the
management of trust funds. What has been called ‘collective capitalism’ has
been adopted fairly widely throughout the Paciﬁc island countries, with
generally poor results – at least for those who are not in management roles.
For example, the Incorporated Land Groups in Papua New Guinea, which
were set up to manage the revenues ﬂowing to customary landowners from
logging and mining activities, seem to have beneﬁted only the people in
charge. A similar approach seems to predominate in the arrangements
adopted for the management of Aboriginal economic activities. Here again,
an effective incentive framework for good governance needs to be developed
if this form of management is to persist.
 
6. International trade issues
 
An ongoing WTO Dispute Settlement hearing raises the question of
whether goods exported from aboriginal lands in Canada that do not inter-
nalise the cost of compensation paid to the aboriginal landowners violate
international trade law (Gray 2002). Recently, the USA imposed an average
27 per cent countervailing duty on Canadian timber, following a ruling by
the USA International Trade Commission that the Canadian exports were
subsidised and posed a threat of material injury to the US domestic timber
industry. Under Article 1.1(a)(1)(ii) of the WTO Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement), a subsidy is deﬁned as a
ﬁnancial contribution that takes place when there is government revenue 
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that is otherwise foregone or not collected. In this case it is argued that the
stumpage fees set by Canada’s provincial governments and levied on trees
harvested from publicly owned land are at less than market value because
they do not include the cost of the government’s compensation to aboriginal
people’s rights to these lands.
In response to the imposition of the countervailing duty, Canada re-
quested the establishment of a panel at the WTO Dispute Settlement Body,
arguing that the US measure violated the SCM Agreement. Canada has





 natural resource and that this does not constitute the provision of
a good, and therefore cannot be countervailed.
In an interesting twist, the Dispute panel has accepted a submission from
an alliance of First Nations peoples in British Columbia which has argued
that the Canadian stumpage fees violate both Canadian law and interna-
tional trade law. They contend that they have never ceded their rights to
their traditional lands. Moreover, they argue that the provincial govern-
ment’s refusal to collect money from the loggers to compensate them for
the timber extracted confers an unfair beneﬁt on forest companies.
From the viewpoint of the WTO, the case raises the difﬁcult issue of
whether the international body can be used to enforce domestic law. There is
also the matter that by recognising a high level of rights towards aboriginal
peoples – as, indeed it does, internationally – this will place Canadian exporters
at a competitive disadvantage. In turn, it could encourage other countries
not to make any formal commitments to Indigenous people that could have
similar impacts.
For agricultural and resource economists the case raises implications
both for our work in the international trade area as well as in the valuation of
natural resources on land held under Native Title. It would seem that the ex-
traction fees set should be market-related, unless there are any non-market
costs that should be taken into account due to the rights to the land held by
aboriginal peoples – such as loss of bio-diversity. An issue therefore is how
to design mechanisms to establish the appropriate fees. A related issue that may
well raise similar complexities within the WTO framework is intellectual
property rights over the cultural practices of Indigenous people that are




Unlike in Canada and the USA – other high-income countries with a small
percentage of aboriginal peoples relative to the total population – the gap
in life expectancy between the Australian Aborigines and the rest of society
is not declining. Is this because of the greater dependence on welfare-type 
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policies and the low reliance on the promotion of individual entrepreneur-
ship and economic development in Aboriginal communities? I believe that
it is. How to stimulate economic development in low-income countries con-
tinues to be a hotly contested topic. But how to do it in the context of Aus-
tralian Aboriginal communities is a topic that has hardly been addressed.
The lack of interest in the question from Australian economists is surpris-
ing. If, suddenly, the populations of Canberra or Fremantle experienced the
life expectancies, the infant and maternal mortality rates, the incidence of
infections presently experienced by Australian Aborigines, and up to 90 per
cent of private and public income came from government, it would be seen
as a problem of such magnitude that it would rank at the top of most
research agendas. The only difference from this hypothetical situation is
that the Aboriginal population is highly dispersed.
Within the general discussion of economic development, there has been
a marked shift away from the ideas that physical capital is the main ingredi-
ent missing from the recipe to promote economic development and that
governments have an important role in production activities. Clearly, there
are important roles for government in promoting economic development in
general and in promoting economic development in Aboriginal commun-
ities in Australia in particular: particularly in the provision of basic health
and education services and access to markets. But just as important, or per-
haps even more important, there is the complex task for governments of
providing the necessary institutions to ensure that Aboriginal communities
and individuals can have the opportunity to participate as fully in eco-
nomic growth and development as the rest of Australian society. In this
respect, I argue that there is a case for not neglecting the possibility that
special institutions may be needed to assist them to overcome their dis-
advantage within Australian society, given the history of prejudice against
them.
Because of their special skills and experience, agricultural and resource
economists have much to offer in developing these special institutions –
particularly in respect of land tenure. Agriculture and resource economists
also have much to contribute with respect to the development of contracts
for mining of Aboriginal lands to maximise the beneﬁts to Aborigines, as
well as to the rest of Australia. We can also contribute to the management
of the natural resource revenues accruing to Aboriginal communities to
help avoid rent-seeking behaviour and maximise the beneﬁts to Aborigines
from these revenues.
Other challenges to the profession can be envisaged in the development
of land management practices that take into account the near subsistence
existence of some Aboriginal communities, their knowledge of their country,
their levels of skills and technical knowledge, and their access to ﬁnance. 
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Given their control over increasingly larger areas of land and water, there
should also be close involvement of Aboriginal communities in the develop-
ment of environmental management policies. I hope to see the profession
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